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MILLEN INDUSTRIES, INC. v.
COORDINATION COUNCIL FOR NORTH
AMERICAN AFFAIRS: UNNECESSARILY
DENYING AMERICAN COMPANIES THE
RIGHT TO SUE FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
When a United States company deals with a foreign state,'
the economic viability of that company may depend largely on
its ability to enforce its rights against that state in the courts of
the United States. Nevertheless, as the law stands today, a
United States company may have no domestic recourse to up-
hold a contract, protect its property, or enforce any legal right
when a foreign state pleads the doctrine of foreign sovereign im-
munity.2 This is especially vital when a company has staked its
entire success upon a particular contract, having foregone other
opportunities while investing significant capital and energy into
a prospective venture. The recent case of Millen Industries, Inc.
v. Coordination Council for North American Affairs' is an ex-
ample of just such a situation.
Today, foreign sovereign immunity determinations are
made under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA or Act).' The FSIA confers a general immunity upon for-
eign states5 and their political subdivisions, agencies, and instru-
1. Under international law, a "state" implies an entity that must meet four essential
elements: a defined territory;, a permanent population; a government; and a capacity to
conduct formal relations with other such entities. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 228-36 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN,
R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. Smrr]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THmD)].
2. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a principle whereby one state's courts de-
clines to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state on the mere basis that
the foreign state is a sovereign, and thus, not subject to the internal rules of the home
state. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
3. 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
4. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2892 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988)).
5. Id. at § 1604. Section 1604 provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is
a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the [s]tates
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mentalities6 from being sued in United States courts, subject to
specified exceptions.1 One significant exception is the "commer-
cial activities exception," which grants jurisdiction, or more pre-
cisely, denies immunity, "in any case in which the action is
based upon a commercial activity" of a foreign state having suf-
ficient contacts with the United States.s
The commercial activities exception of the FSIA neverthe-
less, has failed to provide a consistent standard upon which
courts can make sovereign immunity determinations. United
States courts have generally had difficulty in determining
whether a government's activities in a certain circumstance are
commercial or sovereign, and therefore noncommercial, within
the meaning of the FSIA.9
For example, when a transaction consists of both commer-
cial and sovereign elements, a court must decide whether the
state should be granted immunity based on the sovereign as-
pects of the transaction or denied immunity under the commer-
cial activities exception. To resolve such conflicts, courts have
referred to the explicit language of the FSIA, its legislative his-
tory, and an abundance of case law, but unfortunately, neither
the Act nor its legislative history sufficiently guides a court in
making such determinations. In particular, while a determina-
tion of whether certain behavior is commercial is perhaps the
most important decision a court faces in an FSIA suit, the Act
provides no definition of the term "commercial." 10
except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Id.
6. See id. at § 1603.
7. See id. at §§ 1605-1607.
8. Id. at § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added).
9. See infra notes 68-96 and accompanying text.
10. While the FSIA defines commercial activity as being either a "regular course of
commercial conduct or particular commercial transaction or act," it fails to further de-
fine the term "commercial." 28 U.S.C § 1603(d) (1988). See infra note 60 and accompa-
nying text. The legislative history does provide examples of what activities may be con-
sidered commercial.
"[C]ommercial conduct" includes the carrying on of a commercial enter-
prise such as a mineral extraction company, an airline or a state trading corpo-
ration. Certainly, if an activity is customarily carried on for profit, its commer-
cial nature could readily be assumed. At the other end of the spectrum, a
single contract, if of the same character as a contract which might be made by
a private person, could constitute a "particular transaction or act."
Activities such as a foreign government's sale of a service or a product, its
leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its employment or engagement of
[Vol. XVII:I194
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Instead of defining the term "commercial," the Act provides
that the commerciality of an activity is to be determined by ref-
erence to the nature of the course of conduct, transaction, or act,
rather than its purpose.1' It thus adopted the broader "nature of
the act" test. 2 This open-ended definition of commercial activ-
ity was intended to give the courts flexibility in determining ini-
tial claims of jurisdictional immunity by examining the activity
at issue on a case by case basis. 3 Many courts, however, have
misapplied the "nature" test, and have continued to unnecessa-
rily consider the underlying purpose of a state's activities when
determining whether sovereign immunity should apply.14 More-
over, despite substantial legislative history indicating an oppo-
site intent, many courts have been swayed by political implica-
tions of a particular case rather than relying on the FSIA's
established "nature" test. 5
In Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for
North American Affairs," the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit (District of Columbia Circuit) had to deter-
mine whether a breach of contract claim between a United
States citizen and the Coordination Council for North American
Affairs (CCNAA), a trade instrumentality of Taiwan, fell within
the commercial actiiities exception to the FSIA. Although the
transaction in question was a commercial contract, the court
found that certain individual provisions of the contract were
sovereign,' 7 and thus granted immunity to the CCNAA under
the FSIA.18 The court held that the contract may be bifurcated
laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing agents, or its investment
in a security of an American corporation, would be among those included
within the definition.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AO-
WaN. NEws 6604, 6614-15 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1487].
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
12. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text; compare "purpose" test with Vic-
tory Transport test. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
13. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEws at 6615; see also Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 17 COLUM. J. TANSNAT'L L. 33, 49 (1978).
14. For examples of such cases and for an elaboration on this criticism, see infra
notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 68-96 and accompanying text.
16. 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
17. The sovereign representation included: (1) that Millen would have the benefits
of Taiwanese law;, and (2) that raw materials and spare parts could be imported duty-
free into Taiwan. Millen, 855 F.2d at 885.
18. Id.
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to isolate its sovereign elements (those terms which only a public
entity could offer in a contract), and that the plaintiff could not
bring suit based on these sovereign provisions. In essence, the
court's "bifurcation of contracts" holding ignored both the case
law and the legislative history of the FSIA, and unjustly denied
a United States citizen domestic recourse against the Taiwanese
Government to recover for economic injuries directly caused by
Taiwan's breach of contract.
Millen Industries and the cases before it illustrate the in-
consistency of the United States courts in developing a standard
for upholding or denying immunity under the commercial activi-
ties exception to the FSIA. After exploring the history of the
commercial activities exception, this Comment examines the
Millen Industries case and analyzes the court's holding. The
Comment argues that despite the FSIA's goal of achieving uni-
formity and certainty in sovereign immunity determinations, the
courts have generally failed to establish clear guidelines for ap-
plying the commercial activities exception. Absent a clearer defi-
nition of commercial activity, courts will continue to consider
both the purpose of an activity and the political ramifications of
a case when making immunity determinations, the consideration
of which is explicitly prohibited by the Act. Therefore, this
Comment proposes an amendment to the FSIA that would ulti-
mately reflect a more restrictive theory of jurisdictional immu-
nity by requiring that courts deny immunity to foreign states for
all breaches of contract."9 This refinement of the Act would
achieve two of the FSIA'i original goals - greater uniformity for
American businesses and greater opportunity for United States




A. The General Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in In-
ternational Law
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a principle of cus-
tomary international law under which domestic courts relinquish
19. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
20. See generally H.R. RaP. No. 1487, supra note 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An~mq. NEws at 6604. For a more complete discussion of the background of the
FSIA, see Comment, Martin v. Republic of South Africa: Alienating Injured Americans,
15 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 153, 156-59 (1989).
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jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. 21 One justification for this
principle is based on international comity22 between nations and
on mutual respect and deference that states afford to the acts of
a foreign sovereign. Immunity is also generally necessary for the
effective conduct of international intercourse and the mainte-
nance of friendly nations.2"
The traditional notion of sovereign immunity was the abso-
lute theory, under which a sovereign was immune from jurisdic-
tion in all cases that it was named as a defendant, unless immu-
nity was waived.24 As governments became more involved in
international commercial activities and began to undertake func-
tions which were formerly considered private, most states began
to adopt a more restrictive view of foreign sovereign immunity.
Scholars have argued that the immunity of states engaged in
such activities was not required by international law and that it
was undesirable: immunity deprived .private parties that dealt
with a state of their judicial remedies and gave states an unfair
advantage in competition with private commercial enterprise. 25
Under the restrictive view, foreign sovereigns would be ame-
nable to foreign jurisdiction for their commercial or private acts,
while retaining immunity for their sovereign or public acts.26
21. The principle that courts of sovereign states will decline to exercise their territo-
rial jurisdiction over other sovereign states, their public property and their official
agents, is a rule of customary law which grants a foreign state immunity from local juris-
diction unless it consents to that jurisdiction. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243 (6th
ed. 1963) [hereinafter J. BRmERLY]. Consent in these instances may be determined on an
ad hoc basis or by reference to treaty or agreement between the forum state and the
defendant state. See M. JAMs, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 250, 271 (1988)
[hereinafter M. JAms]; see also J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 208
(5th ed. 1963).
22. "Comity" is a deference shown by one nation's courts to the courts and laws of
another state. M. JANIs, supra note 21, at 250. In the United States, a statement of the
principle of comity is found in Hilton v. Guyot:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, exec-
utive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
23. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812); RESTATE-
1ENT (THIRD), supra note 1, at 390.
24. See Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 116.
25. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28
BRIT. Y.B. IN'L L. 220, 239 (1951).
26. See generally Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 In Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 302, 307-11 (1986)
1991]
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The denial of immunity for commercial acts was based on the
theory that there was an implied waiver of immunity where a
state involved itself in a commercial transaction with a private
individual." At first, an act was considered sovereign or govern-
mental if it served a public or sovereign purpose.28 Thus, any act
of a state for the public good was immune from scrutiny in an-
other state's courts.29 A later test of commerciality avoided a de-
termination of the ultimate purpose of an act, and regarded only
the nature of the activity.30 According to this test, a court may
deny immunity to a state that has entered into a contract, even
if the contract is to serve a public function, on the basis that
contracting with private parties on the open market is commer-
cial in nature.
B. The Development of the Restrictive Theory in the United
States
American jurisprudence dealing with foreign sovereign im-
munity began with the establishment of the absolute doctrine.3 1
Chief Justice Marshall stated that since all sovereigns possess
"equal rights and equal independence" under international law,
a sovereign enters the territory of a friendly foreign government
"in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his indepen-
dent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are re-
[hereinafter Feldman].
27. J. BRMRLY, supra note 21, at 249.
28. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
29. States began to enter into commercial transactions, but continued to demand
immunity because they claimed that the purpose of the transaction was for the public
good. See J. BRmRLY, supra note 21, at 248.
30. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text; J. BRIERLY, supra note 21, at 247-
51 (discussing cases that adopt restrictive theory incorporating distinction between pub-
lic acts and commercial acts).
31. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The United
States Supreme Court applied the absolute doctrine in dismissing a libel claim against a
friendly foreign sovereign for lack of jurisdiction. In Schooner Exchange, M'Faddon and
Greetham filed a libel in federal district court against the Exchange, asserting: (a) that
they were her sole owners; (b) that the ship had been forcibly taken by agents of the
Emperor Napoleon in violation of the rights of the libelants; and (c) that the libelants'
property in her remained unchanged and in full force. The executive branch of the fed-
eral government opposed the libel on the grounds that the vessel libeled was owned by a
friendly foreign sovereign. Id. at 117-20. The district court dismissed the libel "upon the
ground that a public armed vessel of a foreign sovereign, in amity with our government,
is not subject to the ordinary judicial tribunals of the country, so far as regards the
question of title, by which such sovereign claims to hold the vessel." Id. at 120. On ap-
peal, the circuit court reversed and the case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
[Vol. XVII:I
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served by implication, and will be extended to him. '3 2 This the-
ory of absolute immunity, whereby a foreign state could invoke
immunity irrespective of the nature of the activities, encom-
passed a nation's commercial as well as governmental
activities.
33
The inequities consequent to such carte blanche immunity
eventually led the judiciary to defer to recommendations by the
United States Department of State (State Department) when
determining whether immunity should apply. A foreign govern-
ment sued in the United States would first apply to the State
Department for recognition of immunity. If the State Depart-
ment determined immunity to be appropriate, courts tended to
accept the suggestions in deference to the Executive's constitu-
tional responsibility of foreign relations.3 4 The courts, in effect,
moved away from the view that the issue of foreign sovereign
immunity was purely a legal question and adopted the view that
it was a mixed legal and political question with respect to which
determinations of the executive branch should be accorded con-
clusive effect.
35
With the rise of the restrictive principle of sovereign immu-
nity internationally," the State Department, in the 1950s, for-
mally announced that it would also adopt the restrictive view
and henceforth would not recommend immunity where claims
arose from the commercial activities of a foreign state.31 In this
32. Id. at 136-37.
33. Thus, just as Schooner Exchange involved immunity of a foreign military vessel,
the United States Supreme Court in 1926 applied the absolute doctrine to commercial
vessels of a foreign state in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
The Supreme Court in Berizzi Bros. concluded that "all ships held and used by a gov-
ernment... for the purpose of advancing the trade of its people or providing revenue
for its treasury ... are public ships in the same sense that warships are." Id. at 574.
34. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943).
35. The court's rationale was stated in Ex parte Peru: "[C]ourts may not so exercise
their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign, as
to embarrass the executive arm of the [g]overnment in conducting foreign relations." 318
U.S. at 588; see also Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 30.
36. This principle had been recognized on the international scene as early as 1903.
Dralle v. Czechoslovakia, [1950] Int'l L. Rep. 155 (Supreme Court of Austria 1950) re-
printed in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr, supra note 1, at 902. It was
apparent that the restrictive doctrine had become widely accepted as the international
standard of sovereign immunity. Id.
37. See Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to acting Attorney General
Philip B. Perelman (May 19, 1952) reprinted in 26 DEn'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinaf-
ter Tate Letter]. See also L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER &H. Smrr, supra note 1, at
905-06.
1991]
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declaration, the State Department expressed its opinion that the
increasing practice of governments engaging in commercial ac-
tivities made it necessary for persons doing business with them
to be afforded an opportunity to have their rights determined in
court.3 8 It further opined that it was vital to remove politics
from immunity determinations so that litigants would be treated
equitably and predictably.,9 In practice though, these "sugges-
tions of immunity" were still commonly influenced, directly or
indirectly, by diplomatic considerations.40
C. Commercial v. Governmental Activities
A major problem of the restrictive principle of sovereign im-
munity was determining which acts of a sovereign were commer-
cial and which were governmental. There were no specific guide-
lines for a court to follow.4 ' An early test used for determining
when an act was commercial was "the purpose of the act" test,
whereby only those acts that have a public purpose would be
immune from judgment in the United States. For example, a
United States court using the "purpose" test, held that a gov-
ernment's contracting to purchase shoes and other equipment
for its army was an exercise of its sovereign function, and thus
for a public purpose, entitling that government to sovereign im-
munity.42 The "purpose" test creates several difficulties, perhaps
the greatest being that each nation's view of trade is different. In
nations with socialist economies, where foreign trade is consid-
ered to be an inherently sovereign activity, all acts of the state
could be construed to be for a public purpose, which would de-
feat the principle behind the restrictive theory.43 In addition, if
a court must examine an act to determine whether it has a pub-
lic purpose, judges would be forced to rely upon their "personal
38. Tate Letter, supra note 37.
39. Tate Letter, supra note 37.
40. Leigh, Sovereign Immunity - The Case of the "Imias," 68 Am. J. INT'L L. 280
(1974).
41. Guidelines for determining the difference between commercial and sovereign
acts were conspicuously left out of the Tate Letter since it was only a declaration of
policy, rather than a statute.
42. Kingdom of Romania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1918),
cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918).
43. Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (arguing that applying the
"purpose" test could theoretically destroy the commercial exception to foreign sovereign
immunity).
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notions about the proper realm of state functioning."'44 Thus, the
"purpose" test has proved unsatisfactory.
In 1964 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made
an attempt to distinguish between commercial acts and sover-
eign acts by developing its own test. In Victory Transport, Inc.
v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos Y Transportes,45 the
court observed that other countries' concerns for individual
rights and the simultaneous growth of governmental participa-
tion in traditionally private activities caused them to adopt the
restrictive theory.46 Here the court's test limited sovereign im-
munity to five categories of "public acts:" "(1) internal adminis-
trative acts, such as expulsion of an alien; (2) legislative acts,
such as naturalization; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4)
acts concerning diplomatic activity; and (5) public loans.
47
Most courts followed the Victory Transport test until the pas-
sage of the FSIA.45
Despite the movement toward the restrictive theory in cases
44. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 359. For a discussion of Victory Transp., see Com-
ment, Judicial Adoption of Restrictive Immunity for Foreign Sovereigns, 51 VA. L. REv.
316, 321 (1965).
45. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). In Victory Transport a branch of the Spanish Min-
istry of Commerce chartered a ship from the plaintiff, Victory Transport, with the agree-
ment that any future disputes would be arbitrated before an arbitration board in New
York. The defendant ultimately damaged the ship and refused to pay damages and sub-
mit the claim to arbitration. Plaintiff sued in the United States to compel arbitration,
and the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the "restrictive" view of sovereign immunity in
holding that the defendant's activities were jure gestionis or commercial, and it conse-
quently denied the defendant immunity.
46. Id. at 357. Because of the marked changes in the nature and function of sover-
eigns within the previous half-century, "the wisdom of retaining the doctrine [of absolute
sovereign immunity] ha[d] been cogently questioned." Id. The court also cited the rec-
ommendations of the United States Department of State (State Department) as its rea-
son for adopting the restrictive theory. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
47. 336 F.2d at 360.
48. The Victory Transport test was followed in the following cases: Aerotrade, Inc.
v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y 1974) (where Haiti was granted immu-
nity since the subject matter of the transactions out of which the cause of action arose
involved military equipment, even though Haiti used the equipment for nonmilitary pur-
poses); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) (application of the test indicated that a contract for
grain was commercial, but immunity was nonetheless granted since the State Depart-
ment recommended it); Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971) (a contract by a
foreign government with a United States citizen to generate adverse publicity against
another foreign government with whom they had competing interests constituted a pub-
lic act concerning diplomatic activity and as such the contracting foreign government
was immune from a suit for breach of that contract).
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such as Victory Transport,49 United States courts generally re-
mained reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
absent a legislative enactment.5 In response to United States
courts' unwillingness to deny immunity, and in an attempt to
draw the commercial-governmental distinction, Congress en-
acted the FSIA.5
D. Codification Into Municipal Law: The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and "Commercial Activity"
The FSIA sets forth the sole and exclusive standards for
resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign
states in United States courts.2 It is intended to preempt all
other state and federal law, excluding pre-existing international
agreements, 3 and to supersede any previous standards for ac-
cording immunity to foreign governments. 4 Congress passed the
FSIA to effect, inter alia, two immediate purposes: (1) to discon-
tinue the practice of judicial deference to suggestions of immu-
nity from the executive branch;5 and (2) to codify the restrictive
49. For an example of a case espousing the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, see Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
50. McCormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nity and The Act of State Doctrine, 16 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 477, 485 (1984).
51. In early 1973 the State Department and the Department of Justice undertook a
joint effort to standardize immunity determinations in United States courts. The two
departments prepared bills that would codify the restrictive doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity and introduced the identical bill in both Houses of Congress. See Comment,
The Impact of S.566 on the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 6 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus.
179 (1974); Note, Sovereign Immunity: Proposed Statutory Elimination of State De-
partment Role - Attachment, Service of Process, and Execution - Senate Bill 566,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 157 (1974). After some debate, Congress
passed the FSIA.
52. Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of Foreign Sovereign
from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R. 3d § 21 (Supp. 1990).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). Under the FSIA, "[a]ll immunity provisions in sections
1604 through 1607 are made subject to 'existing' treaties and other international agree-
ments to which the United States is a party. In the event an international agreement
expressly conflicts with this bill, the international agreement would control." See H.R.
REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. Naws
at 6604, 6616.
54. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AmiN. NEws at 6604, 6616.
55. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
Arnsm. NEws at 6610. The legislative history expressly states that the FSIA would ac-
complish four basic objectives: (1) to codify the restrictive principle of sovereign immu-
nity; (2) to depoliticize the determination of immunity by transferring the decision from
the executive to the judicial branch; (3) to provide a statutory procedure for service of
process and obtaining personal jurisdiction; and (4) to provide for enforcement of judg-
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principle of sovereign immunity as recognized in international
law.56 First, the removal of the executive branch from jurisdic-
tional issues would reduce the foreign policy considerations in-
herent in immunity decisions and therefore assure due process
for all litigants. 7 Then, by codifying the restrictive principle of
sovereign immunity, the FSIA would bring uniformity and pre-
dictability to the private individuals who were dealing with for-
eign sovereigns. 58 Overall, the FSIA constituted a formal recog-
nition of the need to balance the rights and privileges of the
individual against the interests of the foreign sovereign as well
as the United States.
Under the FSIA, "foreign state[s] [are] immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States," subject to speci-
fied exceptions.5 9 The most important exception - the commer-
cial activities exception - denies sovereign immunity for actions
by a foreign government that are based on commercial activi-
ties.6 0 Thus, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is em-
bodied in the FSIA in terms of the traditional sovereign-com-
mercial dichotomy.
The FSIA defines a commercial activity as "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial trans-
action or act."61 Moreover, the statute requires that the commer-
cial character of an activity be determined by reference to the
nature of the conduct rather than by reference to its purpose.62
Thus, the United States, through the FSIA, has adopted the
"nature" test for determining commercial activity. According to
the Act, the nature test means "the fact that goods or services to
be procured through a contract are to be used for a public pur-
pose is irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial nature of an
ments. Id. at 7-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6605-06.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6605.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmIN. NEws at 6606.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 7, 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 6605, 6611.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) states that: "A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the [s]tates in any case ... (2) in which
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state." Id. at § 1605(a)(2).
61. Id. at § 1603(d).
62. Id.
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activity or transaction that is critical. '6 3 This test effectively
eliminates assertions of foreign states that their commercial con-
duct is immune because such conduct serves a public function.
The legislative history of the nature test is equally clear. It
states that an action on a contract is based on a commercial ac-
tivity even if the ultimate object of the contract is a public func-
tion.6 4 Therefore, conduct such as purchasing cement for mili-
tary purposes 5 or contracting to buy provisions and equipment
to make repairs on an embassy building6 would constitute com-
mercial activity under this standard, regardless of the potential
governmental purpose for these activities.6
E. Application of the Commercial Activities Exception by
United States courts
In practice, the FSIA has allowed private parties the oppor-
tunity to have claims arising out of the commercial activities of
foreign governments adjudicated without creating serious diplo-
matic repercussions.6 ' In fact, the FSIA has had a significant im-
pact on international practice; countries such as the United
Kingdom,69 Canada,70 and several other countries71 have enacted
statutes which apply the same basic principles. However, the
FSIA itself has also been criticized. In a frequently cited opin-
63. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6615 (emphasis added). This view or a similar view has been adopted by
several other countries including Great Britain. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 35,
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123; see also infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
64. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMN. NEws at 6604, 6615.
65. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
66. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws at 6615. This provision was applied properly in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985), where the court rejected Iran's claim of immtnity in an action relating to a con-
tract for the supply of parts for military aircraft.
67. H.R. RaP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6615.
68. Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Conflicts Ap-
proach, 83 COLUM. L. Rav. 1440, 1443 (1983).
69. State Immunity Act, ch. 35, 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123.
70. State Immunity Act, CAN. RaV. STAT., ch. 95, (1985).
71. Singapore, State Immunity Act, 1979 reprinted in Materials on Jurisdiction Im-
munities of States and their Property 28, U.N. Doc. ST/Leg/Ser.B/20 (1982); Pakistan,
State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 reprinted in id. at 20; South Africa, Foreign State Im-
munities Act, 1981 reprinted in id. at 34; Australia, Foreign State Immunities Act, 1985
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715 (1986).
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ion, the court in Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta" observed:
[T]he Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ... [is a]
statutory labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretive
questions engendered by its bizarre structure and its many de-
liberately vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime been a
financial boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the
federal judiciary.
73
A major criticism of the FSIA and its commercial activities
exception has been the inadequacy of the definition of commer-
cial activity. While the FSIA requires courts to refer only to the
nature of a transaction, rather than its purpose, "the absence of
further indication as to the factors relevant for the necessary de-
termination leaves the content of the definition highly uncer-
tain. '74 Originally Congress intended a broad definition of the
commercial activities exception, in order to permit the courts a
degree of flexibility from case to case.75 However, in many in-
stances the standard has become so flexible that United States
courts, in factually similar cases, have inconsistently applied the
commercial activities exception and its nature test. Thus, al-
though the FSIA is clear that the commercial character of an
activity is to be determined by reference to the nature of the
conduct,7 '6 many courts have continued to analyze the ultimate
purpose of a transaction.
In De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua7 7 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) disregarded the
nature test in holding that a government bank's refusal to honor
a check on the country's foreign exchange reserves was not a
commercial activity.78 Here, the Fifth Circuit admitted that it
relied on the motivating purposes behind Banco Central's sale of
dollars. The court explained that the purpose behind the partic-
ular conduct can actually define its nature,79 and therefore,
when the activity took place, the bank was "wearing its sover-
72. 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
73. Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1105.
74. Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399, 404 (1977).
75. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6615.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
77. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
78. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1393-94.
79. Id. at 1393.
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eign rather than commercial hat."8 The court applied a con-
fused interpretation of the FSIA and its legislative history, and
was clearly wrong to examine the purpose of Banco Central's
conduct. One rationale for its refusal to apply the nature test
has been that the court may have been influenced by the recent
strain of relations between Nicaragua and the United States at
that time, and it thus upheld immunity for purely political
reasons.
81
United States courts have especially had difficulty in disre-
garding the purpose of a transaction that involves the adminis-
tration of natural resources.8 2 In MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic
of Bangladesh,8 the court failed to apply the nature test to a
dispute about a contract that required the government of Ban-
gladesh to export monkeys to a United States company. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) con-
cluded that the revocation of the agreement was a sovereign act
and that Bangladesh was immune from suit. In the court's
words:
Bangladesh was terminating an agreement that only a sov-
ereign could have made. This is not just a contract for trade of
monkeys. It concerned Bangladesh's right to regulate imports
and exports, a sovereign prerogative .... It concerned Ban-
gladesh's right to regulate its natural resources, also a uniquely
sovereign function .... A private party could not have made
such an agreement.
8 4
The court's reasoning, however, that a private party could
not have made this sort of agreement, appears to frustrate the
intent of Congress. Private parties do not normally raise armies,
nor do they regulate the exports of natural resources, but they
do contract for the purchase and sale of goods. If the MOL deci-
sion is followed, there will be no security of contract with foreign
governments for the purchase of oil, metals, or other raw pri-
80. Id. at 1394.
81. For a more complete criticism of De Sanchez, see Comment, De Sanchez v.
Banco Central De Nicaragua: Too Many Exceptions to the Commercial Activities Ex-
ception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976., 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 715
(1988).
82. See generally Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 319 (1985).
83. 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).




The MOL court erred in considering the purpose of the
transaction in its decision since the nature of the transaction
was private and commercial. Thus, the court should have denied
immunity. The MOL case, therefore, is a perfect illustration of
the difficulty in attempting to "fit complex issues into pat
phrases such as 'nature' and 'purpose' of the transaction." 6 The
court simply denied it was looking at the purpose of the
agreement.
Courts have also failed to ignore the political implications in
making FSIA determinations. This is especially evident, again,
in the context of natural resources. In International Association
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),87 consumers of oil and
gas sued the member states of OPEC in an antitrust action for
controlling the production and price of oil. The district court
found that the price-fixing activities of the defendant states
were not commercial, and that the states were therefore entitled
to the defense of sovereign immunity.88 The court described the
actions of OPEC as involving regulation of natural resources and
held that exercise of such control over those resources is a sover-
eign activity.89
The court's finding that the OPEC states' activities were
not commercial runs contrary to the legislative history of the
FSIA. Indeed, upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit implicitly recog-
nized that the acts were commercial. The court observed that
"[t]he control of natural resources is the purpose behind
OPEC's actions, but the act complained of here is a conspiracy
to fix prices," which is commercial in nature.9 0 The FSIA in-
structs us to look upon the act itself rather than underlying sov-
ereign motivations.91 The court affirmed the lower court's dispo-
sition of the case, however, because it found that the act of state
doctrine applied. "
85. Feldman, supra note 26, at 309.
86. Feldman, supra note 26, at 309.
87. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), afl'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
88. 1AM, 477 F. Supp. at 564-70.
89. Id. at 567.
90. 1AM, 649 F.2d at 1358 (emphasis added).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
92. 1AM, 477 F. Supp. at 567. The act of state doctrine is a judicial abstention prin-
cipal based largely on separation of powers considerations, and on the presumed inability
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Presumably, the court in IAM v. OPEC was influenced by
the obvious political sensitivity of dragging OPEC into a United
States court. This is evidenced by the fact that one year earlier
in Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel,9e a factually similar anti-
trust suit against a Polish state-owned manufacturer of golf
carts, a Delaware district court held that the foreign state had
engaged in commercial activities and therefore could not avail
itself of the defense of sovereign immunity.14 The overriding ju-
dicial concern for the politically sensitive nature of the dispute
in the IAM case is apparent as dealing in oil is a commercial
activity under the FSIA. The production and distribution of oil
is no more sovereign than is the production and distribution of
golf carts, and thus, it must have been the political pressures
inherent in a suit against OPEC which caused the lAM court to
grant immunity, while the Outboard Marine court denied such
immunity to a state-owned manufacturer. Under the FSIA, the
!AM court was clearly wrong to have granted the OPEC states
immunity.
One of the original purposes of the FSIA was to "de-
politicize" all immunity determinations by removing them from
the executive branch and placing them with the judiciary so that
immunity will be granted on purely legal grounds., If the FSIA
is to function equitably, the courts must apply the commercial
activities exception to all foreign sovereigns in all circumstances
equally.
The commercial activities exception was codified in the
United States for the basic purposes of "depoliticizing" and
"regularizing" judicial applications of the restrictive doctrine of
sovereign immunity.96 In general, the FSIA's failure to set a
stringent standard of what constitutes a commercial activity has
allowed courts the freedom to consider both the purpose of an
activity and to be swayed by political ramifications in denying
immunity. Thus, many courts have failed to interpret and apply
this doctrine and its nature test with consistency. The case of
of United States courts to judge the official acts of foreign countries, due to the lack of
clear standards. See, e.g., De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385,
1389 (5th Cir. 1985).
93. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
94. Outboard Marine Corp., 461 F. Supp. at 394-95.
95. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEws at 6606.
96. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AUMIN. NEWS at 6606. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for North
American Affairs17 represents yet another attempt to define
commercial activity. However, like the cases before it, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit failed to apply the correct nature test,
and thus it granted immunity to the government of Taiwan
when such a privilege was not warranted.
III. MILLEN INDUSTRIES, INC. V. COORDINATION COUNCIL FOR
NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS
A. Facts
Millen Industries, Inc. (Millen) is a leading manufacturer of
shoe boxes in the United States. The CCNAA, is an "instrumen-
tality""8 of Taiwan, organized for the purpose of soliciting
United States persons to establish commercial ventures in Tai-
wan. In 1978 the CCNAA, acting as "public relations agent and
broker" for Taiwan, induced MUllen to establish a shoe-box fac-
tory in Taiwan by promising: (1) that MUllen would have easy
access to raw materials and spare parts through Taiwanese cus-
toms and (2) that raw materials could be imported duty-free
into Taiwan so long as the finished products were used for Tai-
wan's footwear export trade.9 9 However, these promises only
gave Millen the benefits of existing Taiwanese law, and no spe-
97. 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The facts in this case are based on the appellant's
amended complaint and were taken as true by the court of appeals for the purposes of
this decision. MUllen, 855 F.2d at 880. The substantive facts of the case were never tried
in the district court because the district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the
grounds that it failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted and alternatively,
because its claims are barred by the act of state doctrine. Id. The court of appeals de-
cided this case solely on the grounds of jurisdictional questions. The court of appeals
then remanded the case to the district court for "further development of the jurisdic-
tional facts and determination of the jurisdictional question." Id. at 886.
98. An "instrumentality" of a foreign state is considered a "foreign state" under the
FSIA, and thus, is afforded (or denied) immunity under the same principles as the state
itself. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988). The FSIA defines an instrumentality of a foreign state
as any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a [s]tate of the United States, nor created
under the laws of any third country.
Id. at § 1603(b).
99. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Millen Industries, Inc. v.
Coordination Council for North American Affairs, 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
7075) (citing Appellants First Amended Complaint 23, 26, 32-35).
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cial concessions or benefits that were unavailable to similarly
qualified investors. 1°0
In reliance on these representations and promises, Millen
signed a contract with the CCNAA and organized a Taiwanese
corporation, leased machinery to it, obtained all necessary ap-
provals and licenses, 10 1 and in late 1983, commenced operations
of a state-of-the-art shoe-box factory in Taiwan.102 From the be-
ginning, however, Taiwan, together with the CCNAA, refused to
honor its obligations under the contract (1) by obstructing Mil-
len's importation of raw materials and necessary equipment and
(2) by cancelling, without notice, all duty exemptions for raw
materials.10 3 As a result of Taiwan's actions, Millen's plant oper-
ated at a loss and closed in 1985.104 Thereafter, Taiwan did not
permit Millen to remove its raw materials and machinery from
Taiwan, and the CCNAA acquiesced in this refusal.11
Millen sought relief in the District of Columbia Circuit on
four causes of action: 10 6 (1) breach of contract; (2) detrimental
reliance;10 7 (3) misrepresentation; and (4) conversion.105 The dis-
trict court dismissed the suit against the CCNAA because plain-
tiff's claims "alleged promises relating directly to uniquely sov-
ereign import-export activity" and, therefore, was barred by the
act of state doctrine.109 The district court alternatively held that
the complaint alleged no promises at all, and thus, no contract,
and therefore, dismissed counts (1), (3), and (4) for failure to
100. Brief for the United States at 5, Millen (No. 87-7075) (citing Appellant's First
Amended Complaint 11 28-29, 36).
101. Brief for the United States at 5, 6, Millen (No. 87-7075) (citing Appellant's
First Amended Complaint 1 37-43).
102. Brief for Appellant at 14, Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for
North American Affairs, 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-7075).
103. Millen, 855 F.2d at 881. Coordination Council for North American Affairs'
(CCNAA) contract with Millen was made under a program implemented by the CCNAA
under Taiwanese law, which permitted the CCNAA to make promises to foreign inves-
tors like those made to Millen so that it could entice foreign entrepreneurs to start up
businesses in Taiwan. The government of Taiwan had been considering cancelling the
CCNAA program, at the same time it had been contracting with Millen, and the CCNAA
was aware of this. Id.
104. Brief for Appellant at 18, Millen (No. 87-7b75).
105. Brief for the United States at 6, Millen (No. 87-7075) (citing AppeUant's First
Amended Complaint $% 73-75).
106. There was a fifth count, based on 19 U.S.C. § 2462, but Millen abandoned its
appeal of the district court's dismissal of that claim. Millen, 855 F.2d at 881 n.2.
107. The district court renamed this claim "promissory estoppel." Id. at 881.
108. Id.
109. Id. For an explanation of the act of state doctrine, see supra note 92.
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state a claim.110 Millen appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
B. The Court of Appeals Decision: Sovereign Immunity Under
the FSIA
The court of appeals granted the CCNAA immunity under
the FSIA.1 The court held that although the transaction be-
tween Millen and the CCNAA involved both sovereign and com-
mercial elements, the specific promises in the contract, involving
extending duty-free status and the benefits of Taiwanese law
would be considered sovereign. 1 2 Therefore, the court of ap-
peals, upon remand, held that the district court should have no
subject matter jurisdiction over Millen's breach of contract
suit.11.
3
The court, in its holding, relied primarily on its own prece-
dent in Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia,114 which
110. The district court claimed that there was no consideration in the Mullen Indus-
tries-CCNAA contract since Millen was promised only the benefits of existing Taiwanese
law. In other words, any similarly qualified American investor allegedly could have ap-
plied for these benefits, and received them upon meeting certain criteria. Id.
111. The court of appeals held that the district court had erroneously found subject
matter jurisdiction to be proper under the alienage diversity statute. Millen, 855 F.2d at
883. The court of appeals held that since the CCNAA uses an instrumentality of Taiwan,
and since the FSIA applied to Taiwan, the FSIA would be the exclusive basis for juris-
diction. Id. at 883-84 (citing MacArthur Area Citizens Ass'n v. Republic of Peru, 809
F.2d 918, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
The court of appeals removed the case to the district court for the development of
additional jurisdictional facts, which would resolve the applicability of the commercial
activities exception to the FSIA, specifically whether the CCNAA had provided "easy
access ... for imported machinery and equipment." Id. at 885 (suggesting that such a
promise could support jurisdiction under the commercial exception on removal). The
court reasoned that if subject matter jurisdiction was not proper because of immunity
under the FSIA, issues of adequacy of the underlying claim or of the possible application
of the act of state doctrine would be moot. Id. at 882.
The FSIA, by its terms does apply to an instrumentality of a foreign state, such as
the CCNAA. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), (b) (1988).
112. Millen, 855 F.2d at 885.
113. The court did remand the case to the district court for further determinations
of jurisdictional facts. The court acknowledged that potentially the allegation that the
defendant promised the plaintiff easy access through customs for machinery and equip-
ment could refer not to the essentially governmental activities of customs agents but
rather the commercial activity of a commercial "customs expediter." Therefore, the
claims based on the breach of that promise may fall within the commercial activities
exception, and therefore, should not be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Id.
114. 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Practical Concepts:
involved the breach of a technical assistance and consulting services contract
between Practical Concepts, Inc. (PCI), an American company, and the Re-
public of Bolivia. The contract involved a three-year, comprehensive program
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established that a court may, in some circumstances, deny juris-
diction over a commercial transaction as long as there are sover-
eign elements in the contract.115 Practical Concepts also stated
that the commerciality of a transaction must be determined by
reference to the nature of a transaction rather than to its spe-
cific "auxiliary" and "facilitating features,"1116 and therefore, a
transaction which is commercial in nature should not give rise to
immunity. Nevertheless, the court in that case explicitly re-
served the question of the application of the commercial activi-
ties exception to a claim that is "based on"' sovereign element(s)
of a transaction. 7 The same court, in Millen Industries, then
addressed the question, stating that: "when a transaction par-
takes of both commercial and sovereign elements, jurisdiction
under the FSIA will turn on which element the cause of action is
based on. Even if a transaction is partly commercial, jurisdiction
will not obtain if the cause of action is based on a sovereign
activity.'
1 8
This holding enabled the court to bifurcate the contract be-
tween Millen Industries and the CCNAA thus denying jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate plaintiff's claims based on those elements of
the contract that the court believed were sovereign. The court
found that although promotion of investment is ordinarily a
commercial activity in that private 'parties commonly act as pub-
lic relations agents,"1 " the right to regulate imports and exports
is a sovereign prerogative.1 20 Therefore, according to the court's
of development of Bolivia's rural areas. Although the only contracting parties
were PCI and Bolivia, the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) was to provide the funding. After AID cut off the funds, Bolivia
cancelled the contract PCI sued in federal court in the United States.
Millen, 855 F.2d at 884.
115. Id. at 884-85.
116. Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d at 1548.
117. In Practical Concepts, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reversed a district court holding that the Republic of Bolivia was entitled to immu-
nity from suit based on the sovereign elements of the transaction between Practical Con-
cepts, Inc. (PCI) and Bolivia. The district court reached its conclusion, relying on certain
terms in the PCI-Bolivia contract that only a government could perform. First, Bolivia
exempted PCI employees from certain taxes and expedited their immigration and emi-
gration. Also, Bolivia promised not to object if the United States chose to grant PCI
diplomatic privileges. The court of appeals reversed because those terms were auxiliary
to the essentially commercial nature of the transaction. Id. at 1549-50.
118. Millen, 855 F.2d at 885.
119. Id. (citing, inter alia, Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
120. Id. (citing MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326, 1329
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rationale, Millen's causes of action based on the CCNAA's
breach of promises, as well as other allegedly actionable conduct
involving the extension of duty-free status and the benefits of
Taiwanese law, were plainly sovereign aspects of the transaction
over which the court lacked jurisdiction. 121
C. Analysis
The court's decision in Millen Industries is flawed in two
respects. First, by "bifurcating" the contract between Millen In-
dustries and the CCNAA, the court contravened the original leg-
islative intent of the FSIA by failing to apply the nature test
espoused in the FSIA. Second, the Millen Industries court's ap-
plication of the case law on the commercial activities exception
to the facts is clearly insufficient and thus the court's finding
that certain elements of the contract were sovereign is incorrect.
1. "Bifurcation" versus the "Nature" Test
In determining whether the relevant activity is commercial
or governmental under the FSIA, the analysis must focus on the
nature of the activity rather than its purpose.122 Thus, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Practical Concepts123 was correct in
stating that a court, in considering the nature of the transaction,
must only consider the essence or character of a transaction,
rather than its individual, "auxiliary provisions."'1 24 Earlier, in
De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua,25 the Fifth Circuit
had held that:
Congress' intent in instructing us to focus on the nature of
an activity rather than on its purpose was to preclude foreign
governments from always being able to claim sovereign immu-
nity..Whenever a government enters into the marketplace to
buy or sell goods, its purpose ultimately is not to earn profits;
in some sense, its motivation is the public good.
12
1
The legislature, in enacting the FSIA, did not intend the courts
(9th Cir. 1984)).
121. Id.
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988); see also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d
1101, 1108 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
123. Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d at 1543.
124. Id. at 1548.
125. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
126. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1393.
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to bifurcate a contract into individual provisions. The legislative
history is clear that a contract, commercial in nature, must be
considered commercial under the FSIA, regardless of what goods
were covered by the contract.
27
Moreover, the original theory behind the commercial activi-
ties exception is that if a state involves itself in a commercial
transaction with a private individual, it is implicitly submitting
itself to the jurisdiction of the domestic state.1 28 This implied
waiver of immunity is considered equitable since a foreign na-
tion that has ventured to contract with a United States citizen
has acted as a private enterprise, rather than a sovereign, and
should thus be accountable in United States courts for breaches
of that contract. The FSIA requires courts to refer to the nature
or essence of a course of conduct or particular transaction in an
attempt to eliminate the sort of hair-splitting engaged by the
District of Columbia Circuit in Millen Industries. By bifurcating
the Millen Industries-CCNAA contract, the Millen Industries
court ignored the congressional intent of the statute, and al-
lowed a sovereign to avoid adjudication of its commercial con-
tracts with a United States citizen.
2. Application of the Case Law to the MUllen Industries-
CCNAA contract
Even if the bifurcation of a commercial contract was consis-
tent with the FSIA's purposes, the Millen Industries court still
erred in finding that the specific provisions of the contract were
sovereign, rather than commercial. The court examined the ap-
plicability of its holding by relying on MOL, Inc v. Peoples Re-
public of Bangladesh,"9 and by stating that the CCNAA's
promises of duty-free treatment were immune from judicial
scrutiny because they related to an import-export policy which
was a uniquely "sovereign prerogative."' 30 MOL, however, is a
deeply flawed and highly criticized decision.
In MOL, the government of Bangladesh terminated an
127. Such a contract is presumed to be commercial even if the ultimate object of the
contract is a public function. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 16, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6604, 6615. See infra notes 128-34 and accompany-
ing text, regarding the unimportance of the fact that a contract is made for the purchase
or sale of a natural resource.
128. J. BRERLY, supra note 21, at 249. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
129. 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
130. Millen, 855 F.2d at 885.
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agreement that gave a United States company a ten year license
to capture and export rhesus monkeys from Bangladesh for
medical research. In a suit for breach of that contract, the Ninth
Circuit held that Bangladesh was merely "regulating its natural
resources, . . . a uniquely sovereign function"''1 1 and it thus
granted immunity to the foreign sovereign. However, this hold-
ing ignored the strict language of the nature test. The breach of
contract here was a commercial transaction by nature, but the
court nevertheless considered the purpose of Bangladesh's ac-
tions - the regulation of its natural wildlife. The MOL decision
contravened the FSIA, and it has consequently been criticized
by some commentators as a poor decision.1 2 Thus, the District
of Columbia Circuit should not have relied on its precedent in
Millen.
The court should have instead adopted the same reasoning
of Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta,33 which provides a strik-
ingly similar case to Milten Industries. In Gibbons, an "instru-
mentality" of Ireland (IDA) enticed the plaintiffs to invest in
Ireland for capital grants and various tax incentives. After build-
ing a factory pursuant to their agreement with IDA, plaintiffs
never received their benefits and sued in the United States. In
denying IDA's motion to dismiss, the district court said:
While it may well be, as defendants argue, that IDA exists
in order to serve a purpose integral to the Irish government's
plans for Ireland's economic development, the promotional ac-
tivities that IDA generally performs and allegedly engaged in
here are, by nature, no different at all from the promotional
activities engaged by a private public relations firm. 34
Thus, the court found that IDA's activity was commercial in na-
ture, and denied Ireland immunity.
The Millen Industries court, however, dismissed the Gib-
bons holding without much 'discussion. Although the Gibbons
case is not direct legal precedent for the case at bar,'3 5 the for-
mer case provides the correct analysis of immunity under the
FSIA. The CCNAA's liability for breach of its representations to
MUllen based upon its promotional activities is no different from
131. MOL, 736 F.2d at 1329.
132. See Feldman, supra note 26, at 309.
133. 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
134. Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1110-11 (emphasis in original).
135. See supra note 132.
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that of IDA in Gibbons. By applying the nature test, the Gib-
bons court correctly denied immunity to a foreign sovereign for
its breach of contract. If the Milen court had scrutinized the
case law more closely and applied the correct nature test, it
would have found that the provisions of the Millen Industries-
CCNAA contract to be commercial in nature. It then should
have taken jurisdiction over Millen's claims against CCNAA.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FSIA
The bifurcation of the Millen Industries-CCNAA contract
in the Millen Industries case represents merely another court's
attempt to define "commercial activity" with respect to the com-
mercial activities exception to the FSIA. However, neither the
Millen Industries case, nor many of the previous cases have
been able to accomplish this goal satisfactorily. In general,
United States courts' application of the FSIA's exceptions to
sovereign immunity have exhibited a pattern of inconsistency.
The holdings in cases such as Millen Industries are so
troublesome that it may be prudent to amend the FSIA to pro-
vide a workable definition. Although some commentators have
suggested that sovereign immunity in its entirety should be
abolished,"'6 this Comment does not suggest such a drastic pro-
posal. There still remain persuasive legal and traditional reasons
for retaining some sense of sovereign immunity.
137
This Comment suggests an amendment that would provide
adjudication of all claims of breach of contract which is per-
formed partly or wholly in the United States. The sovereign im-
munities statute enacted in the United Kingdom espouses juris-
diction primarily on this basis. The United Kingdom State
Immunity Act of 1978138 establishes the jurisdiction of the En-
glish courts with respect to all contracts that are to be per-
formed in the United Kingdom, in whole or in part, and other
commercial transactions, entered into by a state.139 Amending
136. See generally Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
325 (1986).
137. See supra notes 21-23, 31-33 and accompanying text.
138. State Immunity Act, ch. 35, 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123.
139. Id. at ch. 33 § 3(1) (a) and (b). Section 3 of the State Immunity Act of 1978
states that:
(1) A [sitate is not immune as respects proceedings relating to -
(a) a commercial transaction entered into by the [s]tate; or
(b) an obligation of the [s]tate which by virtue of a contract (whether a
commercial transaction or not) falls to be performed wholly or partly in the
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the FSIA to reflect this more restrictive view of sovereign immu-
nity would be more fair to United States citizens investing
abroad, while retaining the FSIA's original purposes and goals.
Indeed, one of the original framers of the FSIA has stated
that the commercial activities exception was intended "to en-
compass all international trade and banking transactions with
the United States."140 In retrospect, the framer has written, "it
would have been far better to provide for adjudication of all
claims for breach of contract which have the requisite contacts
with the jurisdiction."' Even though the Act was intended to
include all contracts, courts have not followed such intent, and
therefore an amendment is necessary.
Perhaps the following definitions can be utilized to provide
a more consistent standard for making commercial activity
determinations:
"Commercial activity" includes any commercial transaction,
including all contracts and trade that are commercial in
nature.
"Commercial transaction" means:
(a) any contract for goods, services or money
(b) any other transaction into which the foreign state enters
other than in its sovereign capacity.
This test may still require a court to determine if a particular
act is commercial or sovereign. However, it severely restricts
grants of immunity to cases that do not involve commercial con-
tracts or trade. Under this test, any contract or trade would be,
by definition, commercial, and therefore, subject to adjudication
in the United States.
It is clear that the FSIA intended that every contract for
United Kingdom.
(3) In this section "commercial transaction" means -
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guar-
antee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial
obligation; and
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial,
financial, professional or other similar character) into which a [s]tate enters or
in which it engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority,
but neither paragraph of subsection (1) above applies to a contract of em-
ployment between a [s]tate and an individual.
State Immunity Act of 1978, ch. 33, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123, 1124.
140. Feldman, supra note 26, at 317.
141. Feldman, supra note 26, at 309.
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the sale of goods and services be deemed a commercial activity
under the FSIA's commercial activities exception. 14 2 This
amendment" would define every contract that involves a foreign
state's entry into the international marketplace as a commercial
act. By amending the FSIA, the courts will be more apt to follow
the original intent of Congress, and the decisions of the courts
will be' more consistent, creating more certainty for American
businesses investing abroad. Although critics may argue that it
intrudes on traditional notions of sovereignty, such an amend-
ment is necessary in today's world. Markets have become more
international, and governments have entered the market as pri-
vate players. Therefore, the sensitivities of a foreign state should
not stand in the way of the administration of justice where there
is an uncompensated breach of contract and the foreign state
seeks the benefits of United States markets. Application of sov-
ereign immunity in those circumstances would frustrate the ad-
ministration of justice and the intent of Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of the restrictive principle of sovereign
immunity left unresolved the problems of its application. The
major flaw in the FSIA is that it fails to lay down specific guide-
lines for making the commercial-sovereign determination under
the commercial activities exception. The statute requires courts
to make immunity determinations, based on the nature and not
the purpose of a transaction. 43 However, a majority of courts
remain confused in their analysis, 4 4 and no court has yet ade-
quately narrowed the definition of "commercial activity," pro-
vided in section 1603, to give courts a consistent model to follow.
This author's proposed amendment to the FSIA seeks to balance
the concepts of due process and predictability for domestic
plaintiffs while incorporating traditional notions of comity and
sovereign immunity, albeit in a more restrictive fashion. Such an
amendment, if enacted, would undoubtedly alleviate much of
142. Feldman, Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The ABA Posi-
tion, 20 INT'L LAW. 1289, 1290 (1986); see also supra notes 119-26 and accompanying
text.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (d) (1988).
144. See supra notes 68-96 and accompanying text.
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the inconsistency in interpretation of the commercial activities
exception in the courts.
Jonathan Kaiden

